Introduction
The Copenhagen interpretation is more than anything else associated with Niels Bohr's name. Still, it has often been misrepresented by self-declared spokespersons, such as Werner Heisenberg, John von Neumann or Eugene Wigner, who all had their own version of the interpretation to defend. Bohr's view is a very pragmatic approach to understanding quantum mechanics and, in many ways, he seems to have taken a position on epistemology close to American pragmatism. He insisted that the use of classical concepts was indispensable for understanding physical reality, because these concepts were a result of our experiential adaptation to the physical world. He also insisted that the quantum of action was an empirical fact. These points were some of the building blocks in his rejection of scientific
From Darwinism to pragmatism
The headline of this section does not signal a historical adventure from Charles Darwin to Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey. The undertaking is more meant to be an illustration of why a Darwinist is a pragmatist. Pragmatism can be regarded as a humanistic rendering of the epistemological message buried in Darwin's explanation of biological evolution. All pragmatists share four basic assumptions concerning human knowledge: (i) common-sense realism, (ii) empiricism, (iii) actionism and (iv) non-representationalism, which are justified in what we know about human evolution. If we had not been born with a realist instinct, then we could not have survived in a hostile environment. The big predators would have done away with our ancestors a long time ago. Furthermore, the knowledge we have about the environment is acquired through the senses that are the biological organs for gathering information about the external world. Because natural selection has established our sensory modalities to be the only connections we have to the environment, we must rely on sensation and perception when we have to justify our beliefs about the world. However, we also know that perception and action go together. Our experience is a coordination of sensory information and bodily actions. The capacity of concept formation and reflection is successful if the outcome of these cognitive mechanisms is useful for our behaviour. Although Nature is not striving to fulfil an intrinsic aim, the biological adaptation works to the benefit of the survival of a selected organism. Finally, our perception and experience of the environment are not mental representations of our surroundings. The manifest image we have of the world cannot be compared with reality itself, and therefore cannot be justified with respect to the world-in-itself, whereas the scientific image is a representation that can only be compared with the manifest image. Representations are, as Ron Giere [1] and Bas van Fraassen [2] point out, conceptual or visual tools we construct according to our particular purposes. Here, explanation, prediction and unambiguous communication are some of the main purposes inside as well as outside science.
What then is the manifest image? Wilfrid Sellars [3] introduced it to cover the conceptual framework by which we categorize our experience (in contrast to the scientific image). According to the manifest image, the world contains things, organisms and persons as we experience them in our daily life. In this picture, people think and behave for reasons, and they make inferences and critical assessments in relation to their beliefs and norms of evaluation. Thus, I take the manifest image to consist of the conceptual framework that is embedded in our ordinary language. We grasp the empirical world and we judge the relevance and usefulness of our actions with respect to certain epistemic and social goals. The manifest image is not about a world in which we passively register our sense impressions; it is about a world in which we perform an active role as both actors and spectators.
For many pragmatists, human evolution by natural selection is the grounding principle behind their theory of knowledge. This also has some important consequences for understanding the scientific image. I have just said that the scientific image is a representation that can be compared with the manifest image. This is true each time somebody within the scientific community checks explanations and predictions against reports about observations and experiments. In the end, the reading of instruments and understanding of experimental results rely on our perceptual experience and the trust we have in our perception. Thus, a pragmatist takes the scientific image to be a representation of the manifest world, and its success depends on how useful it is in helping us to explain and predict empirical results. Note, however, that I did not say that the pragmatists took scientific theories to be representations of the real world. In this sense, the pragmatists were instrumentalists who denied that scientific theories are representations of reality.
Personally, I distinguish between mathematically formulated theories and models, and I think that theories act as a vocabulary and a set of linguistic rules that scientists use to formulate models. Scientific theories do not express knowledge, but give us the conceptual capacity to talk about invisible phenomena in a consistent and coherent way [4] . The representative element in science is the model which signifies not the world in itself, but the world as we experience it. Again, a model is more or less correct depending on how useful it is; and its usefulness depends on the intended purpose. In some situations, a rough sketch or a crude prediction suffices for the purpose, but, in other situations, this does not serve our goals. Scientific models are like maps. A map represents how we experience, say, a city from a certain perspective. It has been constructed to represent this perspective. At the same time, a city map can be used as a tool both to explain how the various streets are connected, how you get from point A to point B, and to predict what would happen if you take this or that street. The concepts by which we can understand the map, and based on which it was constructed, are determined by the rules of symbols listed somewhere on the map. These symbols correspond in the scientific models to the terms defined by a theory.
Bohr's philosophy of the manifest image
After this brief outline of a naturalistic and pragmatic approach to science, I want to show that Bohr's idea of complementarity cannot be understood unless one is ready to see the affinities between his and the pragmatist approach to science. I think that such a connection is not accidental. Previously I have argued that the Danish philosopher Harald Høffding acted as Bohr's philosophical mentor, but this is not the place to present the historical details [5] . However, Bohr not only shared with the pragmatists the view that scientific theories are not literal representations. He also seemed to hold a similar attitude to theirs about human evolution according to which our natural experience is a result of our cognitive adaptation to our environment. Therefore, Bohr was a naturalist as well as a pragmatist by choice. This choice helped him to find an interpretation of quantum mechanics at the very moment he had to face what he took to be an epistemological lesson. The discovery of the quantum of action, Planck's constant, was the empirical fact that forced physicists to revise classical mechanics. However, the revision itself was constrained by classical mechanics itself, Bohr believed, because it ought to be possible to recover the results of classical physics from quantum mechanics in those cases where there would be no empirically discernible differences. This restriction is epitomized in his well-known principle of correspondence. Now, it is logically impossible to recover classical results from quantum mechanics, unless those concepts by which we describe our observational and experimental experience are the same in the two cases. This opens up two possibilities: (i) a coherent quantum mechanics has to use the same experimental vocabulary as classical physics, perhaps limited with respect to certain applications and (ii) classical physics has to be redefined in new terms borrowed from a consistent quantum mechanics. However, Bohr rejected the last possibility right away. He did that because he strongly believed that the classical concepts such as velocity, acceleration, time, position, momentum and energy were indispensable for any communication of our physical experience. These concepts were the scientific refinement of some of the basic categories that structure our perceptual experience. Kant already identified some of the most important categories such as unity, plurality, difference, causation and space and time, and it is exactly those categories Bohr also had in mind. Both Bohr and the pragmatists were inspired by Kant. Nevertheless, none of them followed Kant in his transcendental a priori reasoning. They all took their inspiration from a posteriori reasoning, especially Darwin's theory of evolution. The quantum theory is characterized by the acknowledgment of a fundamental limitation in the classical physical ideas when applied to atomic phenomena. The situation thus created is of a peculiar nature, since our interpretation of the experimental material rests essentially upon the classical concepts. [6] In the first part of the quotation, Bohr seems to allude to Heisenberg's uncertainty relation that states that, in the area in which the quantum postulate is valid, it is impossible to assign, at the same time, an exact position and an exact momentum to a quantum system as it was in classical mechanics. In the last part, he emphasized that our understanding of experimental results presupposes the use of classical concepts, not classical theories. This is an idea he returned to over the years. Another example is the following statement. 'It lies in the nature of physical observation that all experiences must ultimately be expressed in terms of classical physics' [7] . Note that Bohr is talking about 'the nature of observation'. Thus, it is not accidental that we use classical concepts to report the outcomes of physical experiments. It is something in the cognitive mechanism by which we experience the results that forces us to use classical concepts. But how come?
It is here that Darwin seems to creep into the picture. In several places, Bohr used the term 'adapted to', and this is how I read Bohr: the classical concepts we use to describe our physical experience have evolved from a pre-scientific and manifest image of the world where these categories originally became embodied in common language after they had been acquired through adaptation in the process of understanding our environment in the form of our capacity for sensual orientation and physical interaction. Let us hear it from Bohr himself:
All account of physical experience is, of course, ultimately based on common language, adapted to orientation in our surroundings and to tracing relationships between cause and effect. [8] From a logical standpoint, we can by an objective description only understand a communication of experience to others by means of a language which does not admit ambiguity as regards the perception of such communications. In classical physics, this goal was secured by the circumstance that, apart from unessential conventions of terminology, the description is based on pictures and ideas embodied in common language, adapted to our orientation in daily-life events. [9] The main point to realize is that all knowledge presents itself within a conceptual framework adapted to account for previous experience and that any such frame may prove too narrow to comprehend new experiences. [10] Bohr did not mention 'natural selection' in any of these quotations. Nevertheless, 'natural selection' is what he must have had in mind and is the only concept that makes sense on this level. Bohr is not talking about social or cultural adjustment. Thus, his line of thought seems to be this: first, our cognitive grasp of our environment evolved by the natural selection of some fits categories of thinking based on sensory information we receive from the environment. The fittest categories that he had in mind were spatial relations and temporal successions, and actions in terms of causes and effects. When natural selection gave us the capacity of speaking a common language these fundamental categories by which we understand ourselves in relation to our environment found their expression in this language. Later, we learn by reflective thinking to make these categories more precise in terms of the mathematical definitions as we meet them in classical physics. Finally, we realize that the classical concepts might be restricted in use owing to the quantum postulate.
If this is a correct reading of Bohr, we also see how and when such a restricted application of the classical concepts takes place. The scope for using classical concepts in quantum mechanics is determined by Heisenberg's uncertainty relation. 'Why is that?' we may ask. Bohr's reply was that Heisenberg had discovered that observables, for instance position and momentum, were to be expressed as a non-commutative algebraic relationship, which has the implication that a simultaneous ascription of a definite position and definite momentum is excluded in theory. Later, logical analyses of thought experiments were able to confirm these constraints on the ascription of position and momentum. An experimental set-up that allows a precise measurement of the momentum excludes a precise measurement of the position, and vice versa. However, this claim is not sufficient for the argument to carry through. The consistency of quantum mechanics depends on Bohr's assumption that it does not make sense to apply classical concepts outside the experimental situation. His motivation for this assumption seems to be threefold. First, the existence of the quantum of action makes it impossible to analyse the interaction between object and the apparatus-today, we would say that this impossibility is due to the entanglement of the object and the instrument; second, classical concepts are a result of our adaptation to what we can see by the naked eye, and, therefore, we can express our knowledge in terms of them, whereas they do not necessarily apply to invisible 'be-ables'; and third, classical concepts help us to define a fixed frame of reference, and by describing experiments, in classical terms, we can unambiguously account for the measurement results.
The consequence is, Bohr argued, that . . . no result of an experiment concerning a phenomenon which, in principle, lies outside the range of classical physics can be interpreted as giving information about independent properties of the objects, but is inherently connected with a definite situation in the description of which the measuring instruments interacting with the objects also enter essentially. [11] Properties, such as position and momentum, are not something atomic objects in themselves have but always have in relation to an experimental set-up. It is only with respect to an experimental context that it is meaningful to ascribe kinematic and dynamic variables to atomic objects, because such contexts are accessible to our sensory experience to which these concepts have been adapted.
Bohr's view on the scientific image
Bohr always saw the world from the experimentalist side. Hence, his view had a very pragmatic focus on unambiguous communication about measuring results. He was a realist about atomic objects. Atomic objects are real as they exist independently of any particular experiment, but they possess only kinematic and dynamic properties in relation to a macroscopic experiment. Outside the experimental context, in which a system is taken to be 'free', it does not make sense to assign them any of these properties. However, he was an anti-realist with regards to the quantum theory. This theory is a tool for inferences and predictions. As he once claimed, the nature of science is not to describe the essence of the world but to provide conceptual means for an unequivocal description of what we can expect to experience by measurements. Bohr's instrumentalism was connected to at least a couple of arguments. First, he did not associate the wave function with any representational meaning. It cannot represent how the quantum system exists in the ordinary space but only in an abstract vector space which is a multi-dimensional space. However, such an abstract vector space is not part of physical reality. Instead, Bohr subscribed to Born's statistical interpretation of the wave function as a probability amplitude, whose modulus squared gives us a probability density. This is not a pure theoretical postulate. Making use of Schrödinger's wave function in their calculation all experimental physicists treat it with great success as a probability amplitude. The practical achievement this understanding of the wave function is able to accomplish provides empirical evidence for the soundness of Born's interpretation. There is no 'literal understanding' of an abstract formalism. However, certain terms of quantum mechanics, which do have reference to certain characteristics of our experience of observed objects, are mistakenly understood as referring to properties objectively possessed by the object independently of observation. 
Therefore, Bohr denied that the wave function formalism plays any representational role in telling us how reality is in itself. He considered complex functions as mathematical abstractions that gave us formal means to express relationships. In general, Bohr saw mathematics as a language: 'pure mathematics may be considered as a refinement of general language, supplementing it with appropriate tools to represent relations for which ordinary verbal expression is unprecise or cumbersome' [12] . Indeed, Bohr used the term 'represent' here. However, he distinguished between pictorial and symbolic representations. It is only pictorial representations that represent reality as it is visually accessible for us. Symbolic representations are conventional abstractions, and for that very reason they cannot represent reality as it is in itself. The following quotation summarizes his view on quantum theory in an excellent fashion.
The entire formalism is to be considered as a tool for deriving predictions of definite or statistical character, as regards information obtainable under experimental conditions described in classical terms and specified by means of parameters entering into the algebraic or differential equations of which the matrices or the wave-functions, respectively, are solutions. These symbols themselves, as is indicated already by the use of imaginary numbers, are not susceptible to pictorial interpretation; and even derived real functions like densities and currents are only to be regarded as expressing the probabilities for the occurrence of individual events observable under well-defined experimental conditions. [13] This quotation illustrates that the quantum mechanical formalism, regardless of whether we are considering the wave mechanics or matrix mechanics, does not represent any objective state of a system, but is to be considered as a manual for predicting probabilities which may be one or less than one. Even by calculating real functions, such as densities or currents, we are not expressing anything other than probabilities.
Bohr's anti-representationalism with respect to the quantum physical formalism appears to be very close to what the pragmatists, like William James, thought about scientific theories in general. Pragmatism and anti-representationalism seem also to be lurking in the philosophical background of QBism. For instance, Chris Fuchs endorses William James in several papers:
It is the core of the theory (along with the theory as a whole) that I am starting to view in Darwinian terms. But don't we have every right to posit that core as a property of the world itself, at least as long as that belief serves us well? This . . . has been the predominant image of what science is about heretofore. The only answer I can give you is 'yes, we can' (just as indeed we have heretofore) . . . What I am worried about is whether we should posit it so. [14] His answer to the latter is in the negative. In a footnote, he states that in his opinion physicists of the late seventeenth century wrongly believed that Newton had peered 'into the mind of the Divine and discerned God's blueprints for the universe', and he then adds: 'And you might interpret James and pragmatism in general as a reaction to that [idea] '. This rendition is correct, I think. The pragmatists were interested in what we can do with theories and outright rejected any allocation of a representational structure to them. Taking these remarks together, we realize a strong agreement on this point between Bohr and QBism. They are both realists about atoms but anti-realists with regard to scientific theories. (and probabilism all the way back up) [15] . However, I think there is a difference between QBism's and Bohr's commitment to Darwinism. Bohr saw the classical concepts to be a refinement of our ordinary language. Parts of concepts embodied in our ordinary language are categories that have been adapted through biological selection to our sensory experiences (which themselves have evolved through selections). QBism, on the other hand, associates the Bayesian interpretation of probabilities as a means of survival. An organism needs to be able to learn by experience from its environment, and based on what it has learned it forms an expectation of what is going to happen next. QBism sees the cognitive mechanism by which it calculates its expectation based on a constant updating of its sensory beliefs to be expressed as a calculation of subjective probabilities. An organism that is not able to store information for further use in the future would not survive, and an organism that is better than others to foresee the future will have a higher chance of survival. Hence, an organism that may calculate its expectation based on inductively acquired probabilities is much better off than an organism that cannot make such a calculation.
Darwinism out of the closet
One of the basic assumptions of QBism is that nothing has really changed from how lower organisms process information to how we process information. It is the same mechanism for handling information that Nature uses everywhere. Therefore, what were once personal probabilities for actions are still personal probabilities for action. Fundamental probabilities express purely subjective degrees of actual belief, but the Bayesian calculus sets the rules for how these probabilities can be related. Therefore, QBism suggests that, when Schrödinger's wave function for all practical purposes is associated with probabilities via the Born rule, we are not facing a new kind of probability or a new kind of probability assignment. In quantum mechanics, we are still talking about individual assignment of probability values.
Why QBism is not Copenhagenism but a close cousin
A comparison between QBism and Copenhagen not only shows some important similarities, but also some important differences. I will raise five different questions concerning some of the main concepts by which we understand quantum mechanics in order to make an evaluation and critique.
(a) What is a quantum state?
Neither Copenhagen nor QBism holds that the wave function represents an objective state of affairs external to the observer. Fuchs and Schack give this recent characterization: 'A quantum state does not represent an element of physical reality external to the agent, but reflects the agent's personal degrees of belief about the future content of his experience' [16] . The first part poses no problem for a Copenhagenist. Bohr stressed many times that the formalism has the character of being a tool for predictions (i) '[T]he ingenious formalism of quantum mechanics, which abandons pictorial representation and aims directly at a statistical account of quantum processes. . . ' [17] and (ii) 'The formalism thus defies pictorial representation and aims directly at prediction of observations appearing under well-defined conditions' [18] . However, Bohr would most likely have had some hesitation towards the second part. I say most likely because his view on probabilities was, as we shall see in a moment, different from QBism. In my opinion, Bohr would not have gone any further than saying that the quantum mechanical formalism gives us a manual for predicting probabilities. This was his pragmatist view. The predictions are about possible outcomes and only indirectly about beliefs of future experiences, i.e. if we were going to witness these outcomes.
One should also be aware that what is characteristic for tools is that they rarely represent anything. They have the function that they are designed to do some work of action in the right circumstances. Indeed, a map has a representational function, but in all those cases in which a tool, like a map, has a representational function it has been designed so that we are able to compare the representation with what is represented. This is definitely not the case with the wave function. Therefore, where Bohr would probably have argued that the use of the wave function could inform us about the statistics of possible outcomes, and, based on this information, we may individually assign personal beliefs to ourselves and others, Fuchs and Schack seem to be saying that the wave function directly represents these personal beliefs. If this is correct, one must ask how the wave function can possibly be compared with personal beliefs.
(b) Is there a measurement problem?
Proponents of both Copenhagenism and QBism deny that there is a problem of measurement. In this respect, they are similar but for various reasons. Assuming that the wave function is a tool only for the prediction of probabilities, it is not meaningful to argue that a measurement creates the physical collapse of the wave function. Only if one holds that the state vector stands for an objective property of the quantum system, and, therefore, that Schrödinger's deterministic evolution in configuration space describes this property, does it make sense to talk about a collapse and how this collapse might take place. Bohr never spoke about the collapse because for him there was no collapse. It was something Heisenberg invented to be able to talk about potentia in configuration space and actualia in the physical three space. For similar reasons, one might have expected that QBism would not accept the existence of a measurement problem. However, this is not entirely the grounds that Fuchs and Schack mention: 'There is no measurement problem in QBism because the agent and the agent's experience are part of the story from the beginning' [16] . Bohr would have thought that this is to go too far. It is enough for any argument against the suggestion of a measurement problem that Schrödinger's equation does not give an objective description of the motion of the quantum system. As long as you are an instrumentalist concerning the wave function, no argument can get you to believe that there is a measurement problem. It does not matter what sort of probabilities you support. It can be a problem only in the case that you are a scientific realist and believe that our best scientific theories give us a true or approximately true description of the world.
In contrast to Bohr, Fuchs and Schack are not instrumentalists. The quantum state represents our personal beliefs. Hence, the probability assignment is redistributed from the preparation to the final experience. If, as Fuchs and Schack hold, the agents' experience is part of the story from the very beginning, some form of reduction of the wave function seems to take place by virtue of changing expectations.
(c) Contextualism of what?
Both QBists and Copenhagenists are contextualists but it seems that they hold different opinions about what has to be included in the context. Contextualism contains at least a semantic and an epistemic dimension that in Bohr's case go together. If it does not make sense to associate a certain concept with a certain observation, it is also impossible to claim that you have beliefs of what you see in terms of this concept. Let us call this 'semantic contextualism'. In contrast, it is possible to urge that in certain contexts one is deprived of having a particular knowledge in spite of the fact that our concepts for having such knowledge are well defined in those contexts. In quantum mechanics, that would be a case in which we cannot simultaneously measure non-commuting observables because of hidden variables.
Bohr was the first to point out that the experimental context plays an important role in using classical concepts to describe a quantum object. Classical terms, Bohr argued, have no meaning in quantum mechanics outside the experimental context. The apparatus constitutes the necessary conditions for attributing a classical property, and, together with an actual outcome, they form the necessary and sufficient conditions of attributing such a property.
The essential lesson of the analysis of measurements in quantum theory is thus the emphasis on the necessity, in the account of the phenomena, of taking the whole experimental arrangement into consideration, in complete conformity with the fact that all unambiguous interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism involves the fixation of the external conditions, defining the initial state of the atomic system concerned and the character of the possible predictions as regards subsequent observable properties of that system. Any measurement in quantum theory can in fact only refer either to a fixation of the initial state or to the test of such predictions, and it is first the combination of measurements of both kinds which constitutes a well-defined phenomenon. [19] In other words, Bohr suggested that the word 'phenomenon' should refer to an observation in which it is impossible to separate the behaviour of a quantum system from the experimental context in which it takes place. The reason is that, if a reference to the experimental setup establishes the necessary condition under which we meaningfully can ascribe a particular property to the system, it is the experience of the outcome of a measurement that constitutes the phenomenon.
Turning our attention towards QBism it is more difficult, at least for me, to say whether this view implies semantic contextualism, or only a form of epistemic contextualism, and if it maintains semantic contextualism whether this includes a reference to the agents' experience. It is safe to say that QBism holds a form of the epistemic version of contextualism, as can be seen from one of Fuchs' papers:
I am indeed quite intrigued by the possibility that quantum mechanics may be nothing more than a calculus for comparing probabilities when the experimental context cannot be deleted from the results it brings about. In vague philosophical terms, I think this is precisely the kind of idea Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli were bandying about in constructing their interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is certainly the kind of notion Bohr was trying to get at with his emphasis on 'complementarity.' So I would welcome a more precise way (a mathematical way) of expressing the essence of all this. I myself have been attracted to this sort of thing for a long time: it is a large part of the thread connecting my 'Notes on a Paulian Idea' -that is, that the observer sets the context, and, in the words of Pauli, cannot be 'detached' from what he finds. [14] The experimental context determines the outcome and what we are going to see. However, how far does the observer set the context so he cannot be 'detached' from what he discovers? I know what Bohr argued. The physicist chooses and prepares the experimental context in which he wants to study the quantum object. Thereby, he selects what kind of concept it is relevant to employ in the description of the outcome. However, as soon as the instrument operates, no conscious interaction exists between the agent and the system under investigation. What the observer is going to find is a result that is not dependent on the agent's subject but on the physical features of the apparatus. As I said above, the observer's beliefs are informed by his actions, the kind of experiment he performs, what he can expect given the predictions of the quantum theory, and by the physical outcomes. QBism, or Fuchs, seems to move further. Not as far as Wigner, who assigned the mind with an active causal role. However, in an epistemic sense in which the agent has to grasp the specific outcome before it turns into a measurement.
(d) What is a probability?
Here QBism is clear: 'QBism adopts the personalist Bayesian probability theory pioneered by Ramsey . . . and de Finetti . . . and put in modern form by Savage . . . and Bernardo and Smith . . . among others. This means that QBism interprets all probabilities, in particular those that occur in quantum mechanics, as an agent's personal, subjective degrees of belief. This includes the case of certainty-even probabilities 0 or 1 are degrees of belief' [16] . However, Bohr was not so clear: he accepted Born's interpretation of the wave function as a probability amplitude but not much more. The amplitude says something about how and where we may expect to record the impacts on the photographic screen. It has been discovered that the probability changes between two experimental situations in which one slit is open and in which both slits are open. The two cases differ in the sense that the probability distribution changes from being particle-like to being wave-like. However, these are experimental results that cannot be used to retrodict anything about the kind of nature of the quantum object before it was measured. Thus, Bohr would probably have interpreted probabilities as frequencies, less likely as objective propensities or as personal probabilities. He often spoke about the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics.
Clearly, frequencies may be interpreted as relations between data concerning possible and actual outcomes. So again, Bohr would argue that these data inform an agent about what he or she might expect to believe or what he or she has to believe. I guess that, after the agent is informed by his or her experience, he or she may put different weight on different information. Hence, one may distinguish between frequencies and personal probabilities and then argue that frequencies are what cause our personal probabilities.
What I personally like about QBism is its Darwinian approach to probabilities. I find Bayesian models fascinating myself, because they can imitate almost any cognitive task. However, there are good reasons not to be too enthusiastic, especially if you are a Darwinian. Even if Bayesian models may be able to replicate our thinking, it is not thereby certain that our reasoning actually follows a Bayesian algorithm. In a recent paper, Jeffrey Bowers and Colin Davis [20] argue that the empirical evidence in psychology for a Bayesian model of reasoning is weak and even weaker when it comes to empirical evidence in neuroscience. So if these scientists are correct our brain is not operating on the basis of Bayesian inferences [20] .
Nonetheless, inferences in quantum mechanics may still be interpreted in Bayesian terms. The formal characterization of Bayes' theorem requires prior probabilities, but how should we interpret these probabilities? Here QBism takes them to be degrees of personal belief in the truth of statements. However, the use of Bayes' theorem does not necessarily require an interpretation in terms of subjective probabilities. By understanding prior probabilities as personal Bayesianists need to impose further constraints upon these probabilities in order to obtain convergence of opinion in the light of experimental evidence. A sensory experience is about something, it gives rise to a belief that has an epistemic content, which may be an outcome of an experiment. So it is not the experience, or the belief this experience generates, but the content of the belief to which we as agents assign a degree of probability value. It is the classical epistemic distinction, between subject and object, which Bayesianists have to overcome in any account of empirical evidence.
In keeping with its Darwinist roots, this is how QBism may meet the convergence of opinion. The capacity of experience is an innate disposition for acquiring information about the environment and this capacity has evolved by virtue of selection and adaptation. Through our senses and actions, we may gain beliefs about the actual environment and the information we get determines the form of our beliefs. The epistemic subject is what carries the belief, whereas the object is what the content of the subject's belief is all about. We may then assign different degrees of probabilities to the belief we have depending on the amount of information we have about its content. This makes us not only realists about the perceptual world, but realists by instinct, i.e. in a Darwinian sense where our belief in an external world is ingrained in the way we perceive the world.
(e) What is an experience?
The antinomy of perception is that experience is at one time both private and public. My experience is mine, your experience is yours, but we nevertheless often experience the same thing, because our experiences have the same content. This is exactly the epistemic challenge. To solve the antinomy, we have to make a distinction between the epistemic subject and object known, between the experience and its content, not in the way in which Descartes situated the problem, but as evolutionary epistemology will make it. Take the following statement made by Mermin:
Because outcomes of Copenhagen measurements are 'classical', they are ipso facto real and objective. Because in QBism an outcome is a personal experience of a user, it is real only for that user, since that user's immediate experience is private, not directly accessible to any other user [21] . I think that this is a mistaken analysis and does not lead to the convergence of opinion. If Mermin is correct, QBism is in for a lot of philosophical problems. However, Darwin's theory of evolution explains why human experiences do not differ from one person to another when they both are looking at the same outcome. Each person has the same perceptual capacities of experience, and the classical concepts of which Bohr believed were indispensable for understanding measurements can be seen as an explication of the innate categories of perception. Therefore, the question of experience is not about whether or not our experience is private. Unless either you or I are colour blind, evolution guarantees that we see the same colours; it guarantees that I see spin-up when you see spin-up under the same experimental circumstances with the same outcome. In the last case, we both need a concept of spin, but given that human evolution makes the intersubjective agreement certain.
Our shared experience gives rise to common beliefs, given that we possess the same concepts of understanding. By definition, a common belief is one which has the same content for those who share it. The difference between you and me may appear in the way we treat our beliefs. We may have different wishes, different priorities and different interests; we may even have different assumptions about what is the correct strategy to go for in order to reach a certain goal. This means that we are back to how we should understand probabilities. If we take probabilities to be about beliefs, this means that you and I may very well assign different values to the same beliefs. Fuchs and Schack are very explicit about how they interpret probabilities, whereas Bohr, as we saw, did not give it much thought, and, if he had, he would probably have been a frequentist. But being either a proponent of personal probabilities or a frequentist does not affect what kind of belief one acquires while perceiving the same outcome.
Conclusion
In many ways, Copenhagen and QBism are on the same side of the fence. Neither of them accepts that we can have knowledge of a reality-in-itself by virtue of those cognitive mechanisms and dispositions Nature has given us as perceptual agents. Both positions build heavily on the evolutionary and pragmatic virtues. Bohr understood the important distinction between subject and object, between experience and the content of experience, whereas QBism rightly points to the fact that in the light of our Darwinian heritage the assignment of probability values is always a matter of personal information and expectation. A compromise been Copenhagenism and QBism could be that most of our personal beliefs are about external matters and that evolution has made it such that our genes do not allow us to see many things too differently. Thus, our experience in quantum mechanics is a result of information about experimental data. However, such a compromise is not possible so long as QBism holds that the quantum state represents our personal beliefs instead of being a tool for predictions of possible outcomes.
